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Feminist Jurisprudence
Patricia Smith, ed.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993,
628 pp.
Reviewed by Catherine Wrightt
Feminist legal scholars have recognized the exclusion of feminine
voices in our legal system, and our concepts of equality, justice, and
rights. In particular, feminist scholars have challenged the assumptions of objectivity and neutrality that are ostensibly the foundation
of our legal system.
Feminist jurisprudence is a collection of these excluded voices
initially brought together for a course in feminist legal theory.
Editor Patricia Smith selected twenty-five previously published articles from such feminist legal scholars as Andrea Dworkin, Frances
Olsen, Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Minow, and Deborah Rhode.
In the introduction, Smith defines feminist jurisprudence as the
"analysis and critique of law as a patriarchal institution." 1 The
rejection of patriarchy defines feminism. There is, however, no
clear method by which to achieve this purpose. The result is a
diversity of views within feminism. The presentation of the liberal,
radical, Marxist, socialist, postmodern, and relational feminist
perspectives is thus helpful when seeking to understand some of these
views, although Smith warns that "nearly all feminists are too
eclectic to fit neatly into any one category." 2
The articles cover six main traditional, philosophical subjects
typically found in general jurisprudence texts such as: equality, justice and harm, adjudication, freedom, human dignity, and legal
theory. Each section has its own introduction and provides background analysis of the subject area. Smith compensates for the exclusion of the issues of "rights" and "punishment" by including
suggested readings in her bibliography. This bibliography also cont
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1 P. Smith, ed., Feminist jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993) at 3.
2 Supra note 1 at 9.
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tains further readings on the subjects covered in the book as well as
general reference materials.
While each article raises questions about traditional legal assumptions and analysis, the selection and placement of the articles
also serves as a learning experience for the reader by illuminating
the history and scope of the debate. Smith provides a selection of
more general articles along with detailed discussions of particular
approaches. The inclusion of summary articles, such as Christine A.
Littleton's "Reconstructing Sexual Equality," give the reader perspective on the development of an issue or case law.
The juxtaposition of contrary viewpoints highlights the differences in perspective or approach within the feminist community. An
example of this is the pairing of Robin West's "Jurisprudence and
Gender" with Joan C. Williams' "Deconstructing Gender." West
suggests that our legal and political system needs to develop the
"value of intimacy" and that feminism should use women's experiences to express the need for a community, including a judiciary,
that incorporates "nuturant, caring, loving, empathic values."3
Williams rejects this approach, instead attributing the economic
marginalization of women to this "feminism of difference," and argues that inequality is the inevitable result of a perspective which
celebrates difference. She attempts to deconstruct gender by disassociating gender roles from biological sex differences, thereby allowing for reforms in areas like childcare which will not backfire
and keep women marginalized. 4
The inclusion of articles focussed on a particular law allows for
a concentrated critique of some of the
sexist areas of law and
shows how feminist scholarship can help to transform specific laws.
The section on "Justice and Harm" contains articles on rape, spousal
abuse, and sexual harassment which examine the recognition of the
"new" interests women have in their personal integrity.
Problems within the feminist debate are raised throughout. In
the section entitled "Freedom: Restriction, Regulation, and
Reproductive Autonomy," the articles deal mostly with concerns
and controversies surrounding reproductive control. However, Laurie
Nsiah-Jefferson's chapter entitled, "Reproductive Laws, Women of
Colour, and Low-Income Women," indicates a key problem in
feminist debate: How can legal challenges accommodate the
3
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various interests where the solution for one group of women may
have negative political and social affects on another group?
This collection provides much scope for class discussion and its
arrangement may provide further insight into the development of
various feminist perspectives. However, the section introductions are
generally cursory and do not discuss the reasons for Smith's inclusion of the articles found in that section. This leaves the reader
who is new to this field, and outside a classroom setting, without an
indication of the special contribution some of the chapters make to
legal scholarship in general, and to feminist jurisprudence in
particular. A notable example of this is Susan Estrich's piece
entitled "Rape." In this article the author's own experience as a rape
victim personalizes her critique of the law of rape, thereby
precluding any recourse to the traditional assumption of
objectivity. The piece is thus an example of how feminist scholars
are not only changing the content of the traditional debate but also
the way in which the debate is conducted. The omission of a note on
the contribution of this piece and others leaves the reader without
needed background. However, this may not be a great a
disadvantage where the book is used as part of a course and the
professor is able to provide the necessary background.
Smith recommends Feminist jurisprudence as a text for a
"special topics" course in jurisprudence,5 requiring the accompaniment of a general text in jurisprudence. Regrettably, Smith has not
been as inclusive in her selection as she could have been. Her selection is limited to American scholars and has therefore not benefitted from Canadian perspectives or other contributors. Furthermore,
while this collection provides a good sense of the range of theoretical perspectives involved in the feminist legal debate, other
perspectives, such as those of lesbian or disabled women, are not
well represented.
Another limitation of this collection is that it contains only previously published articles, spanning from 1983 to 1990. As a course
text, this book will likely age quickly as new voices demand to be
heard. What Feminist jurisprudence does accomplish, however, is to
bring many important articles together under one cover. Previous
American collections have been quite small, and the richness of this
collection may be welcomed by professors and students.
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Feminist jurisprudence provides a good sampling of the complexities surrounding the philosophical and practical concerns
within the feminist debate. The various issues covered suggest different angles on the attack of patriarchy while underlining how
deeply our social structure, and the laws which sustain it, have been
constructed according to a patriarchal blueprint.

